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The Point of the View of the Universe: Sidgwick and Contemporary Ethics by Katarzyna de 
Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer (Oxford University Press) £30.00/$55.00 
Pre-Print: To be published in the Philosophers’ Magazine (2014) 
In each chapter of The Point of the View of the Universe: Sidgwick & Contemporary Ethics, 
Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer introduce a central idea from Henry Sidgwick’s 
19
th
 Century philosophical classic The Methods of Ethics. The first chapter begins by 
describing how Sidgwick understood moral philosophy as an attempt to find a rational 
reasoning procedure which we could use to discover what we ought to do, in the most all-
encompassing possible sense, as individual human beings. On this view, philosophers can use 
reason to examine and revise our often confused and inconsistent everyday ways of making 
decisions. The ultimate end of the rational reasoning processes would then be to guide us to 
do what we have most reason to do overall. 
The second chapter describes how Sidgwick disagreed with David Hume about the role of 
reason in practical deliberation. Hume had thought that reason plays a role only in 
discovering what the means to our fundamental goals are – goals that are set by our will and 
desires. In contrast, Sidgwick believed that the faculty of reason can itself come to know 
which ends all rational beings are required to have irrespective of their desires. Such practical 
requirements of reason must be based on objective reasons provided by the world itself rather 
than by what goals we happen to have. This is why acting against the best reasons is irrational 
– it violates the dictates of reason.  Sidgwick also described how moral cognitions can 
produce various impulses in us to act accordingly. 
Chapter three introduces three stages in the development of moral deliberation. At the first 
stage, people rely on their immediate moral intuitions about the concrete cases they face 
without appealing to any rules. The problem is that different people have different intuitions 
about these cases, and even our own intuitions are not always consistent or confident. 
Because of this, we often seek more general moral principles that we could all in principle 
intuitively agree on. This is why at the second stage we end up with common sense moral 
rules that are often captured in the language of virtues. For example, the rules ‘Be Truthful!’ 
and ‘Help other people!’ could be suggested as belonging to the basic common sense 
standards of morality. Sidgwick argued that the problem is that such rules offer no guidance 
in the situations in which they conflict, and that if there is an agreement on these rules it is 
only based on contingent cultural fashions. Finally, at the third theoretical stage, we attempt 
to look for a deeper unified justification for the common sense principles discovered during 
the second stage. The purpose of such a theoretical justification is offer us a critical 
perspective for evaluating those principles.  
In Chapter four, de Lazari-Radek and Singer introduce Sidgwick’s fundamental methods of 
doing moral philosophy. Sidgwick stipulates four standards for evaluating whether a given 
moral principle is a self-evident axiom of reason that corresponds to the objective 
requirements of morality. Such a principle must be formulated in clear and precise terms, it 
must be stable in careful critical reflection, it must belong to a body of consistent principles 
and it should be a principle which all equally competent rational people agree on. The 
argument is that the common sense rules of morality introduced in the previous paragraph fail 
to pass these standards.   
Sidgwick famously argued that there are three axioms of practical reasoning that pass the 
previous test. The principle of justice says that morality requires that we treat like cases in the 
same way. The principle of prudence requires that we aim at our own good on the whole over 
our lifetime. Finally, the universal principle of benevolence claims that, as rational beings, we 
are required to promote the good of everyone generally.  
Chapter six describes the problem these principles create for Sidgwick. The problem is that 
there will always be cases where promoting your own overall good will conflict with the 
requirement to promote the overall good from the point of view of the universe. This 
conclusion conflicts with the idea that fundamental rules of morality should be mutually 
consistent. Sidgwick himself never found a satisfactory solution to this “dualism of practical 
reason” problem.  
In chapter seven, de Lazari-Radek and Singer offer their own solution to this puzzle.  Already 
during Sidgwick’s own time, it was argued that practical intuitions would be unreliable if 
there were an evolutionary explanation for how we came to have those intuitions. This is 
because in that case the way in which we came to have those intuitions would not have been 
sensitive to what objective reasons we have. The authors then argue that there is an 
evolutionary explanation for why we think that we should pursue our own good, which 
undermines the idea that we really have objective reasons for doing so. They also argue that 
there is no evolutionary explanation for why we would think that we should maximize the 
general good from the point of view of the Universe and for that reason this requirement must 
be a discovery made by reason – a reliable general faculty which we evolved to have. 
Chapters eight and nine then explain and defend Sidgwick’s views about what is good. 
Sidgwick was a hedonist – he thought that only happiness, understood as the balance of 
pleasures over pains, is good. According to him, pleasure furthermore consists of a feeling 
that the experiencer takes to be desirable. Thus, ultimately de Lazari-Radek and Singer end 
up with a view that our reason requires that we maximise the amount of feelings in the world 
that are taken to be desirable by the beings who experience them. 
The final three chapters outline the logical consequences of this view. This view first turns 
out to offer only a criterion of rightness and not a principle that we should use in our 
everyday deliberation (as this would not have the best consequences). It also sets a 
demanding standard on what we ought to do, but this standard is defensible in the situation 
we are in, given that there are millions of people live in extreme poverty. Finally, the view 
entails that we should promote the happiness of animals and people, present and future, even 
if this leads to the counterintuitive conclusion that we should bring about vast numbers of 
them. 
De Lazari-Radek and Singer succeed in explaining Sidgwick’s views in a clear and engaging 
way, though at times the long discussions of contemporary moral philosophy get in the way 
of keeping track of Sidgwick’s own line of thought. Perhaps there could have been more 
interpretation and structuring of Sidgwick’s views. 
In addition to explaining Sidgwick’s central theories, this book also has two other central 
aims. The first one is to show that Sidgwick deserves to be considered as one of the greatest 
moral philosophers. I have mixed feelings about whether the book successfully achieves this 
aim. In the final chapters, the authors do show how Sidgwick deserves immense credit for 
investigating what the consequences of utilitarian thinking really are, especially with respect 
to future generations. It is a shame that it took almost 100 years after The Methods of Ethics 
for us to recognise how important and ground-breaking this work was. 
In contrast, I fail to be convinced by this book that some of Sidgwick’s other central ideas 
will stand the test of time. It seems like a mistake to think that moral philosophy should 
essentially aim at evaluating deliberation procedures with standards such as (i) how clear the 
terms used in these procedures are, (ii) how stable their outputs are in careful reflection, and 
(iii) how much there is agreement about the procedures. This book nicely explains many 
brilliant ideas Sidgwick had but without really stopping to consider their significance for 
contemporary moral philosophy beyond the authors’ own interests. Among these great ideas, 
I would include Sidgwick’s objections to relativism (that it fails to leave room for 
disagreements), his discussion of the principle of justice (which basically introduces the idea 
of supervenience to moral philosophy) and his critical discussion of virtue ethics (that it is 
circular).  
Finally, the book also attempts to vindicate Sidgwick’s views as a plausible stance in 
contemporary moral philosophy. The authors want to defend (i) non-naturalist realism in 
metaethics, (ii) maximizing act-utilitarianism in normative ethics, and (iii) hedonism as the 
fundamental theory of what is good both for us and universally. These defences are also a 
mixed bag. In metaethics, the authors fail to say much at all about their positive view and 
their criticism of the main expressivist alternative is badly confused. The defence of 
utilitarianism is much better, as you would expect from Singer--one of the leading 
utilitarians. The responses to the standard objections to utilitarianism are both clear and 
powerful. These responses deserve to be studied by both utilitarians and opponents alike. The 
defence of hedonism lies somewhere in the middle of these two extremes.  
Overall, the book is a very interesting attempt to bring Sidgwick back. In some areas, it is 
very successful in this. The book shows how far Sidgwick took utilitarianism in the context 
of topics whose significance has only been recognised very recently. In other areas, the book 
is less successful. There is not much metaethicists can take home from it. This, however, 
should not be a surprise, given that Sidgwick’s work predates all the central discoveries that 
were made in logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, metaphysics and 
epistemology during the 20
th
 century.      
